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1. Introduction 
 
 
Economic integration reduces the barriers of movement of goods and factors. Though many 
countries still maintain high barriers for the movement, especially for labour, it is fair to say that 
the world is gradually moving towards reduction of the barriers. Economic literature has to some 
extent already addressed integration that leads to reduction of barriers for the movement of goods 
and capital. The integration of the labour market, especially the link between labour market 
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integration and remittances is however, a relatively understudied field1. This paper addresses this 
gap in the literature.  
 Integration of labour market should initiate the movement of labour from the low wage to 
the high wage countries. This phenomenon was observed following the enlargement of the 
European Union in 2004 which integrated Eastern and Western Europe. Many Eastern European 
and Turkish migrants regularly send remittances to home countries. In addition, we observe that 
the global labour market, especially of skilled workers, to some extent has become integrated 
through the advent of the internet. Many people are now searching for jobs in foreign countries, 
by themselves, using the internet which was unthinkable just ten years ago. Many of them send 
remittances to home countries. It can be observed that developing and transitional counties 
directly or indirectly subsidise/support this migration to increase the inflow of remittances. In 
doing so, the countries are indirectly competing with each other in the international labour 
market. 
 In this paper we question this policy of supporting migration for remittances when labour 
markets are integrated. We show that instead of subsidising, the home countries are better off by 
taxing migrants. To illustrate this, we propose a model where migration of labour takes place 
                                                 
1Chen (2009) and Haufler and Wooton (2010) studied product market integration and foreign direct investment; 
Haaland and Kind (2008), Braun (2008) and Morita (2012) studied the relationship between trade barriers, 
innovations and R&D subsidies. We found that Bretchger (2001) and Lundborg and Seregstrom (2002) have studied 
the linkage between labour market integration and innovation using a quality ladder growth model. Iranzo and Peri 
(2009) studied the link between migration flow and trade flow with reference to Eastern-Western European 
Integration. Haaland and Norman (1995) studied the effects of European Integration on production and factor prices. 
Lavenex and Uçarer (2003) addressed the issues relevant to immigration and asylum following European 
Integration. 
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from two home/sending countries to one host/receiving country. The existence of two sending 
countries captures strategic interactions of labour sending countries in international migration. 
The receiving countries, in reality, are often the rich developed countries who act as leaders in 
international migration by setting their own policies first. In this paper also, the receiving country 
moves first by setting the migration tax2. Given the policies of the receiving country, the sending 
countries design tax/subsidy policies to maximise national output plus remittances. In doing so, 
they engage in a Bertrand type competition with each other.  
 Our paper is aligned with the strategic trade policy literature, especially the model 
proposed in Brander and Spencer (1985) where two countries engage in a tax/subsidy 
competition to export goods to a third country. In a non-cooperative situation both countries 
provide a positive subsidy to maximise welfare if the goods exported are substitutable. Gatsios 
(1990) extended the model by looking at the optimal policies of the importing country. He found 
that the importing country practises discriminatory tax policy to maximise welfare where the 
most efficient producer receives a higher tax burden. Contrary to Brander and Spencer (1985) we 
find that sending countries should tax the migrants and this tax policy improves the income of 
the other sending country. In the case of the receiving country we see that the receiving country 
uses discriminatory tax policy and the tax burden is higher for the country with the higher labour 
endowment. This result is similar to Gatsios (1990) where the most efficient producer bears the 
highest tax burden. The findings of this paper shed doubt on the policies of many developing 
countries that promote migration. It is however to be noted that apart from remittances, migrants 
                                                 
2 Migration tax is not possible in an integrated market like the European Union. However it is already in use for 
migration from developing to developed countries. It can be observed in the form of high visa application fees, 
mandatory medical check-ups, limited entitlement of social security system etc. 
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are also regarded as the source of other types of benefits such as investment, human capital 
formation and business networks3. Nevertheless remittances are the most tangible and immediate 
benefit of migration and deserve adequate attention.  
 The competition of countries in international migration so far received little attention in 
the mainstream economic literature and this is really surprising given the importance of strategic 
trade to the economists and policy makers. Competition among countries for remittances is 
certainly having effects on the benefits of migration. However we can only find vague reference 
to competition in the policy literature, without any clarifying discussion. In the publication of 
International Organization of Migration (IOM) titled ‘Labour Migration in Asia’, for example, 
references of competition have sometimes been provided without any detailed discussion on the 
nature of such competition (IOM 2003). We believe that the paper will be able to fill this gap in 
the existing literature and will be useful in designing the migration policies of developing and 
transitional economies. Though the model we use heavily borrows from international trade 
literature, especially strategic trade policy, we greatly believe that similar analysis needs to be 
conducted to address ‘international migration’. Clemens (2011) interestingly mentioned that term 
‘international trade’ is 13 times more frequent than ‘international migration’ in all the published 
article abstracts contained in the Research Papers in Economics(RePEc). Before proceeding 
with the main analysis we describe the structure of the paper. The second section describes the 
complete model. It also identifies the conditions for the equilibrium of migration. The third and 
fourth sections deal respectively with the optimum emigration and immigration taxes. The main 
results are given in proposition format in those sections. The fifth section is the concluding 
section and provides policy recommendations based on the analysis of the paper. 
                                                 
3 Docquier and Rapoport (2012) provides a recent survey on migration, brain drain and economic development. 
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2. The Model 
 
2.1. Basic Assumptions and Notations 
 
We assume that there are three open economies C , I  and U  producing two 
internationally traded goods 1X  and 2X . The prices of the goods are fixed. We select the units 
in a way that the relative price of two goods is just 1. Endowments of labour are fixed, denoted 
by iL  for country },{ ICi∈ and uL  for country U . The technologies and labour endowments of 
the countries are such that country C  and I  specialise in the production of good 1 and country 
U  specialises in production of good 2. Hence the wage rates in C  and I  are given by the value 
of marginal products of labour in producing good 1 in these two countries. Similarly wage rate in 
U is given by the value of marginal product of labour in producing good 2 in U . The 
assumption of specialisation helps us to simplify the analysis.  
 We assume that the wage rate in country U  is greater than the wage rates in C  and I  
which initiates migration following integration of labour markets. Migrants repatriate all the 
income back to the home country. The national income of the home is given by the production of 
1X  plus the remittances received. We assume preferences are such that the countries always use 
a part of income to consume both goods. The countries export the goods in which they specialise 
and import the others. We assume that migration does not alter this pattern of comparative 
advantage. As migration affects the production and consumption of goods in the countries under 
consideration, it may also affect the world price levels and may reverse the pattern of the 
specialisation and wage differentials. As the aim of the analysis is not to evaluate the welfare 
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from trade and/or modification of comparative advantage, we assume fixed prices throughout to 
keep the analysis simple. The assumption of fixed price, additionally, allows us to work with 
national income equation instead of a welfare function, as when price is fixed, higher income 
implies higher welfare. It should also be noted that the world may consist of many goods, factors 
and countries whereas we are working with a partial equilibrium model with only three 
countries, two goods and one factor. In this sense our analysis is somewhat restrictive. The 
incorporation of more countries, sectors and factors may change our results substantially. 
 To facilitate further analysis we specify the forms of the production functions. For 
{ }ICi ,∈ , let us assume that the production of 1X  is depicted by 211111 2 iii L
bLaX −= , where 1iX  
denotes the amount of 1X  produced in { }ICi ,∈ , 1iL  is total amount of labour used in 
production of 1X , 1a  and 1b  are coefficients. Differentiating with respect to 1iL , the value of the 
marginal product of labour in 1X  is obtained as 111 iLba − . Therefore the value of the marginal 
product of labour varies between 1a  and iLba 11 − .  
 The production of 2X  in { }ICi ,∈  is given by 222 ii LaX = , where 2a  is the amount of 
labour required to produce one unit of 2X  and 2iL  is the amount of labour used for production 
of 2X .  Differentiating with respect to 2iL , the value of marginal product of labour is obtained as 
2a . Hence, country { }ICi ,∈  switches labour from 2X  to 1X  if the value of marginal product of 
labour in 1X  is greater than the value of marginal product of labour in 2X . That is, if 
2111 aLba i >− . Let us assume that 211 aLba i >− . Thus with trade and without integration i  
necessarily specialises in production of 1X . Without integration the workers of i  receive wage 
ii Lbaw 11 −= . 
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On the other hand, assume that country U  has a linear production technology for 1X , 
which is written as 111 uuu LaX =  where 1uL  is the amount of labour used and 1ua  is the 
coefficient. The value of the marginal product of labour is 1ua . The production of 2X  is given by 
2
2
2
222 2 u
u
uuu L
bLaX −= , where 2uL  is the amount of labour used in production of 2X  in U . The 
value of the marginal product of labour in 2X  is 222 uuu Lba − . Thus the marginal product varies 
between 2ua  and uuu Lba 22 − . Country U  thus specialises in production of 2X  if 
122 uuuu aLba >− . Assume that this assumption holds, hence U  specialises in production of 2X . 
Without integration, the workers of country U  receive wage uuuu Lbaw 22 −= . 
 With integration, the wage rate in U becomes ( )2222 ICuuuu LLLbaw ++−= . We assume 
that 1uu aw >  throughout as such the country still specialises in production of good 2X  after 
integration. Additionally iuuu LbaLba 1122 −>−  such that, without integration, the wage received 
by labour in country U  is higher than that of C  and I . This wage gap initiates migration.  
 The game we consider is as follows. First the receiving country, that is, country U sets its 
tax policies for migration. Given the tax rates, C  and I  set their emigration tax policies. Given 
the tax policies of C , I  and U , the labour from C  and I migrate to country U . As labour can 
migrate freely, it is possible all the labour of C  and I  to migrate to U  if wage gaps are large 
enough. To avoid such extreme situation we assume that the equilibrium of labour market is 
reached well in advance of that. 
 
 
 
 9 
2.2. Equilibrium Migration between Country i  and U  
 
 In the previous sub-sections we defined the model and showed the conditions under 
which { }ICi ,∈  specialises in production of good 1X  and U  specialises in production of 
good 2X . In this section we calculate the equilibrium of labour migration. We assume that 
integration of labour markets equates the wage rate of i  and U  through migration. The equality 
of wage rates also implies full information and no travel costs, which are obviously two 
simplifying assumptions. 
 Instead of using direct quantitative restrictions, both sending and receiving countries use 
taxes to control migration.  Let iD  be the per capita tax imposed by country i . Let us call it the 
‘domestic’ tax for i . Similarly let iT  be the per capita tax imposed by country U  on the migrants 
of country i  and call it the ‘foreign’ tax for i . In the calculation we assume ji TT ≠ . However the 
difference of tax rate depends on the receiving country, as it may well wish to set ji TT =  
implying no discrimination policy. The following two equations must be satisfied in the 
equilibrium of migration assuming full information, perfect mobility and no travel costs: 
 
( ) ( )2112222 CCCCICuuu LLbaDTLLLba −−=−−++−    (1) 
 
( ) ( )2112222 IIIIICuuu LLbaDTLLLba −−=−−++−    (2) 
 
 Hence the wage of migrants minus domestic tax and foreign tax must be equal to the 
wage received by domestic workers. As shown in the equation, the migrants face two barriers. 
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One comes from the domestic tax and another comes from the foreign tax. The domestic tax can 
be assumed to be a proxy for some kinds of barriers, similar to the ‘Bhagwati Tax’ (Bhagwati 
and Dellalfar 1973) aiming to discourage migration and increase national income. The foreign 
tax, however, has a different purpose. The foreign tax transfers a part of the income of the 
migrants to the national income of the receiving country. The foreign tax is a proxy of monetary 
entry barriers which is above the administrative cost of managing the inflow of labour.   
Solving the equations the following solutions of equilibrium migrations are obtained, 
 
( )( )22112 uIuCC bGbbGVL −+= −∗       (3) 
and  
( )( )22112 uCuII bGbbGVL −+= −∗       (4) 
 
where 
( )211 2 ubbbV +=  and 
( ) ( ) iiuuuii DTLbaLbaG −−−+−−= 2211  
 
 1−V  is inverse of V . We assume that 0>iG , because to initiate migration the wage rate 
in U  must be higher than the wage rates in i  plus taxes4. Equations (1) and (2) have been 
plotted in Fig. 1. 2CL  has been plotted in the vertical and 2IL  has been plotted in the horizontal 
axis. The line 1 corresponds to equation (2) of country I  and line 2 corresponds to equation (1) 
of country C . Two lines have been assumed to intersect at point A . We must assume the values 
                                                 
4 It necessary implies that tax rates are not prohibitive and the solutions for labour migration are positive. 
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of iL , uL , 1a , 1b , 2ub  in a way that the conditions of intersection of the two lines in the positive 
quadrant are satisfied. To ensure stability it is also needed that the intercept of line 1 of country 
I  in vertical axis is higher than that of country C . 
 
 
Insert Fig1 here 
  
 
 It is observed in Fig. 1 that a country can affect the other country’s labour migration by 
altering its own domestic tax rate.  By reducing the domestic tax rate, country C  shifts the line 2 
to line 3. The stability requirement implies that the new equilibrium of labour migration would 
be on the vertical axis where migration from country I  is nil. Nevertheless, it is not the case that 
a reduced tax rate is always associated with a net welfare gain for the labour sending country. 
The changes in tax rates can have beneficial or detrimental effects, which we analyse in the next 
sections.   
 
 
3. Imposition of a Domestic Tax 
 
In the previous section we have defined our model and found the equilibrium amount of 
labour migration given the domestic and foreign tax rates. In this section we analyse how the 
sending countries determine their domestic tax. It can be considered as the second stage of the 
game. We assume that the sending countries determine their domestic tax rates given the tax 
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rates already selected by the receiving country in the first stage of the game. To analyse the 
process of determination of tax rates by the sending counties, we first look at the effects of the 
domestic taxes on the equilibrium labour migration. Differentiating equations (3) and (4) with 
respect to iD  we obtain that the marginal changes of labour migration of the countries are,   
 
( )2112 u
i
i bbV
D
L
+−=
∂
∂ −  
and, 
( )212 u
i
j bV
D
L −=
∂
∂
 
 Adding the two we obtain ( )1122 bVD
L
D
L
i
j
i
i −−=
∂
∂
+
∂
∂ . Thus when a country increases its 
domestic tax rate, labour migration of that country decreases and that of the other country 
increases but in total the overall labour migration decreases. This result is obtained as the labour 
migration of a country responses more in absolute value to the changes of a country’s own tax 
rate, compared to the response it has to the changes of other country’s tax rate. As the country i  
increases its domestic tax rate, the migrants of i  find that the income at home is higher than the 
net income they receive by working in U . Hence some migrants withdraw from U . As wage 
rate in U  increases, migration from j  increases, however in total, the stock of migrants 
decreases. 
 Below we state one of the most important results of the paper: 
 
Proposition 1: The optimal domestic tax rate is positive. 
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Proof:  
In order to prove the proposition we first need to define the national income equations of 
the sending countries. The national income equation of country i , after cancelling out the 
domestic tax, is written as 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 2222222121 2 iijiuuuiiiii LTLLLbaLL
bLLaY −++−+




 −−−=         (5) 
 
 Hence national income is the summation of the output produced at home and the wage 
remitted by migrants working in U 5. The domestic tax cancels out in the above equation as 
migrants cannot send the same amount as remittances that they have already paid to their 
countries as domestic tax. By differentiating the income equation of i  in equation (5) we obtain 
the marginal change in the income,   
 
( )( ) ( )( )
i
j
iu
i
i
iu
i
i
ijiuuu
i
i
ii
i
i
D
L
Lb
D
LLb
D
LTLLLba
D
LLLba
D
Y
∂
∂
−
∂
∂
−
∂
∂
−++−+
∂
∂
−−−=
∂
∂ 2
22
2
22
2
2222
2
211  
 
 Using the migration equilibrium conditions of equation (1) or (2): 
 
                                                 
5 We assume that migrants remit all the income back to home. In reality migrants do keep some income in the 
country of residence, consume and make investment. Some migrants, especially permanent migrants, may not remit 
anything. We, however, assume full repatriation of remittances to simplify analysis. In the appendix 2, further 
calculations have been done assuming that migrants do not remit all the income home. 
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( )( )122211 bLbbbDVD
Y
iuui
i
i −+−=
∂
∂ −  
 
 Setting 0=
∂
∂
i
i
D
Y  we get 0>iD , or for 0=iD  we have 0122
1 >=
∂
∂ − bLbV
D
Y
iu
i
i . Therefore 
the optimal domestic tax rate is positive.□ 
 
 The proposition has substantial implications for the migration policies of developing and 
transitional countries. It shows that labour sending countries cannot depend only on remittances 
to maximise national income. They also need to control migration by imposing positive tax rates. 
The result can be compared with that of Brander and Spencer (1985) where the subsidy acts as a 
transfer but a positive subsidy is required for profit shifting effects. Here, however, we see that 
instead of a subsidy the country should tax the migrants. The reason why this result is obtained 
explained further as follows. When the domestic tax is zero, given any foreign tax, migration is 
at the maximum. The imposition of a positive domestic tax discourages some people from 
migration. Hence the marginal product of labour at home falls and the marginal product at 
U increases. The migration from the other sending country increases but that does not reduce the 
wage rate to the previous level. The difference between the remittances and the domestic wage 
rate of a country is given by the domestic tax rate of that country which is actually equal to the 
loss of per capita remittances. When the domestic tax is zero, the loss of per capita remittances is 
zero, hence domestic tax increases national income as the output of the country is now higher. 
 We are also interested to know if the positive domestic tax has anything to do with the 
existence of another country and a positive foreign tax. Let us first assume that country j  is 
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inactive such that out of equation (1) and (2) we have only one equation6. The remaining 
equation therefore has no 2jL  term. Therefore differentiating the income equation, 
 
( )( ) ( )( )
i
i
i
i
i
iu
i
i
iuuu
i
i
ii
i
i
D
LT
D
LLb
D
LLLba
D
LLLba
D
Y
∂
∂
−
∂
∂
−
∂
∂
+−+
∂
∂
−−−=
∂
∂ 22
22
2
222
2
211  
 
 Using the migration equilibrium condition stated in Footnote 5, 
 
( ) ( )21
22
21 u
iu
u
i
i
i
bb
Lb
bb
D
D
Y
+
+
+
−=
∂
∂
 
 
 Setting 0=
∂
∂
i
i
D
Y  we get 0>iD . Therefore the optimal domestic tax is again positive. 
Thus, with or without the presence of competition from the other sender, a country should pursue 
the policy of a positive domestic tax rate. Interestingly a positive domestic tax rate has nothing to 
do with the foreign tax being positive. Irrespective of the foreign tax rate, the country must 
pursue a positive domestic tax policy. The following proposition however shows that, in a 
strategic situation, domestic taxes imposed by the countries do have effects on each other. 
 
Proposition 2: Marginal increase in domestic tax rate by country i  implies increase of income of 
country j . 
                                                 
6 Equilibrium condition is ( ) ( )211222 iiiiiuuu LLbaDTLLba −−=−−+− , the solution is, 
( ) ( )
( )21
2211
2
u
iiuuui
i bb
DTLbaLbaL
+
−−−+−−
=  
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Proof:  
 The income equation of j  is 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 22222222121 2 jjjjiuuujjjjj LTLLLLbaLL
bLLaY −++−+




 −−−=  (6) 
 
Differentiating the income equation of j  in equation (6) with respect to iD  and after 
necessary calculation we get the marginal change of the income of j  as 
 
( ) 012221 >+=∂
∂ − bLbbDV
D
Y
iuuj
i
j  
 
 Hence the country j  experiences an increase in income.  □ 
 
 This proposition is quite obvious, but interesting. If country i  increases its domestic tax, 
it reduces migration from i  and increases wage rate in U  . Hence, with same migration, country 
j  is better off. The migration from j  increases, but not by that much to bring the wage rate 
down exactly to the previous level. Thus with higher wage rate and higher migration, j  
experiences higher income.  
 Therefore, the competition among the countries is not really harming each other. The 
countries have a unilateral incentive to use positive tax but it does not reduce the income of the 
other country, instead increases it. On the contrary, if a country decides to follow the policy of 
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subsidising migration or to reduce the domestic tax rate, it is harmful for the other country. As 
obtained in Proposition (1), a migration subsidy cannot be the optimal policy response of a 
sending country. 
 
 
3.1. The Optimum Domestic Tax 
 
 As already mentioned, the selection of optimum domestic tax can be considered as the 
second stage of the game. In the first stage the leader U  sets the foreign tax. In the second stage 
country C  and I  set domestic tax rates to maximise national incomes. Thus the game is to be 
solved using backward induction which involves finding the solutions for optimum domestic tax 
rates assuming the tax rates of U  given. The country i  when selecting the domestic tax rate iD  
considers that the other country j  keeps domestic tax rate jD  fixed. Hence the countries engage 
in a Bertrand type competition for setting domestic tax rates. We have already seen from 
Proposition (1) that i  will have a positive domestic tax in order to maximise national income 
irrespective of the domestic tax rate of j . Therefore positive solutions of domestic tax rates exist 
that satisfy the first order conditions of maximisation. The solutions (calculation in Appendix 1) 
for the domestic tax rates are  
 
 
( ) ( )( )BTwATwHD IDICDCC −−−= −1       (7) 
( ) ( )( )BTwATwHD CDCIDII −−−= −1       (8) 
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where Diw , H , A  and B  are as defined in the Appendix. 
1−H  is the inverse of H . Proposition 
(1) shows that optimum domestic tax rates are positive. But it is not directly observable from 
equations (7) and (8) as tax rates depend on the values of the other parameters of the model 
namely 1a , 2ua , 1b , 2ub  iL  and uL . Later we assume 121 == ubb  to look at the solutions a bit 
more clearly. From equations (7) and (8) it can nevertheless be seen how changes in foreign tax 
rates have effects on domestic tax rates. This is stated in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: If the foreign tax rate for i  increases then the optimal domestic tax rate of i  
decreases and that of j  increases. 
 
Proof: 
 Differentiating the solutions of iD  from (7) or (8) with respect to iT  we get 
 
AH
T
D
i
i 1−−=
∂
∂  
and 
BH
T
D
i
j 1−=
∂
∂
 
 
 Therefore the optimal domestic tax rate for i  decreases and that of j  increases.  □ 
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 This result is an important proposition from the policy makers’ perspective.  If the tax 
rate for i  is increased, then migration from that country decreases. This implies that the domestic 
tax rate for i  is no longer in equilibrium and is higher than the amount required for controlling 
migration. Thus the equilibrium domestic tax rate of i  decreases.  On the other hand, more 
people from country j  migrate to U  as the wage rate is now higher. Thus the domestic tax rate 
for j  becomes lower than the equilibrium value. Consequently, the equilibrium domestic tax rate 
of j  increases.  
 It may be of some interest to look at the effects in national output of U  when the sending 
countries increase the domestic tax rates. To see it note that the national output equation of U  is 
 
( ) ( )2222222 2 jiu
u
jiuuU LLL
bLLLaY ++−++=  
Therefore, ( )( ) 





∂
∂
+
∂
∂
++−=
∂
∂
i
j
i
i
jiuuu
i
U
D
L
D
LLLLba
D
Y 22
2222 . As 0
22 <





∂
∂
+
∂
∂
i
j
i
i
D
L
D
L , national output 
decreases when the importing countries increase their domestic tax rates. It implies that U  will 
prefer to have no domestic tax imposed by the sending countries. 
 
 
4.  Imposition of Foreign Tax by U  
 
 The first stage of the game involves setting of the foreign tax by country U . We assume 
in this section that U  sets ji TT ≠  which implies possible discrimination. It is not possible in an 
integrated zone like European Union. However it is possible when migrants move from a 
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developing to a developed country by job search using the internet. For example, it is possible 
that the developed country may use different entry barriers for the entrants of different countries. 
This assumption of different tax rates brings us close to works like Gatsios (1990) and Hwang 
and Mai (1991) where the tax policies of the receiving country were analysed. The reason to 
adopt a similar model is the presence of market power of the rich developed countries. As the 
rich countries are powerful, it is often possible for them to move first by setting policies to fulfil 
their own objectives. The poor countries merely follow the path paved by such policies. Thus in 
our model the importing country U  acts as a Stackelberg leader by setting its policies first. The 
country sets the tax rates contemplating that country C  and I  will set their domestic taxes to 
control migration after fixation of foreign tax rates. By foreseeing this U chooses the tax rates to 
maximise its objective function. Below, we state some results in propositions: 
 
Proposition 4: If U increases the tax rate for i  then the labour migration of i  decreases and that 
of j increases. The total labour migration decreases. 
 
Proof: 
 To prove the proposition we need to recall the solutions of labour migration in equations 
(3) and (4). 2iL , that is, labour migration is function of iD  and iT . But iD  is also a function of 
iT . In the Appendix 2 it has been shown by further calculation that 02 <∂
∂
i
i
T
L , 02 >
∂
∂
j
j
T
L
 and 
022 <
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
i
j
i
i
T
L
T
L . □ 
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 The proposition shows that the labour migration of country i  decreases and that of 
country j  increases. We have already illustrated that a country decreases the domestic tax rate if 
foreign tax rate of own migrants is increased, thereby partially offsets the rate of decrease of 
migration. However, if the other country’s foreign tax is increased then the country increases its 
own domestic tax rate, thereby partially offsets the rate of increase of migration.  As the overall 
labour migration decreases, the imposition of positive tax rates by U  decreases the national 
output of U . Hence maximisation of national output cannot be the reason for a positive 
migration tax. Below we explore the cases where the country may use positive tax rates. 
 
Proposition 5:  U  may impose a positive foreign tax in order to maximise the income of the 
permanent residents. 
 
Proof:  
 
The objective of the receiving country may be to maximise the income of the permanent 
residents of the country. Thus it maximises the national output plus tax minus the wage of 
migrant workers. The objective function is therefore, 
 
( )( )( ) 22222222 jjiijijiuuuUUN LTLTLLLLLbaYY +++++−−=      (9) 
 
  
Differentiating with respect to iT  and assuming tax rates are initially zero we obtain, 
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( ) 222222 i
i
j
i
i
jiu
i
UN L
T
L
T
LLLb
T
Y
+





∂
∂
+
∂
∂
+=
∂
∂  
 
 Thus the first part of the expression is negative whereas the second part of the expression 
is positive. Therefore, if a tax is imposed it can increase or decrease the income of residents. 
Therefore the country may also subsidise migration to increase national income.7 □ 
  
One question that may arise here is whether this tax rate has anything to do with 
competition of the sending countries. It actually does not alter the result significantly. If we have 
just one country the change in the income of permanent residents is 2222 i
i
i
iu
i
UN L
T
LLb
T
Y
+
∂
∂
=
∂
∂ . As 
again the first term is negative and the second term is positive, the sign depends on the relative 
magnitude of the two terms.  
Proposition (5) shows that the power of the receiving country depends on how sending 
countries response to the changed tax rates. If  
i
i
T
L
∂
∂ 2  and 
i
j
T
L
∂
∂ 2  are almost equal in absolute 
value, then the first term of the above expression is almost zero and the national income of U  
may increase. That is, if the migrants of country i  are to a large extent replaced by the migrants 
of country j , then country U  does not experience production and tax revenue losses and 
accordingly the income of residents increases. This is apparently happening in most developed 
countries. These countries are highly dependent on foreign labour force, but still maintain high 
                                                 
7 Further calculation here will not change the qualitative result. To see it let us assume that 121 == ubb . Hence we 
obtain ( ) 2227
2
iji
i
U LLL
T
Y
++−=
∂
∂
. Therefore if 22 ji LL = , the income increases but if 22 ji LL ≠ , income 
may increase or decrease.  
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entry barriers. The reason is probably the existence of large pools of skilled and unskilled 
workers in the global market who are willing to migrate and work in developed countries. These 
barriers are effectively increasing the entry cost for foreign labour force. Proposition (5) also 
suggesting that the countries may practise the policy of subsidising migrants.   
Another issue we wish to analyse is the relationship between the labour endowment and 
the tax rate faced by a country. It is an important issue to analyse as it is well known that a 
monopolist discriminates on the basis of the willingness of a consumer to pay in purchasing a 
good. In our analysis we may regard the receiving country a monopolist who is allowing the 
migrants to work in its territory. Additional workers increase output, but the country acting as a 
monopolist may also discriminate in designing the tax policy with an aim to maximise the 
national income. Here is it very easy to discriminate as arbitrage is nearly impossible in 
international labour migration. We however do not completely ignore the possibility that 
migrants from a sending country can first move to the other sending country before moving to 
the receiving country. 
To understand what may form the basis of discrimination, we work with a case where the 
country U wants to maximise the income of its permanent native workers. Not surprisingly, if 
the country wants to maximise the income of permanent workers, that is, wage plus tax revenue, 
then it imposes a positive tax rate. The income of the permanent workers is, 
 
( )( ) 222222 jjiiujiuuuLU LTLTLLLLbaY ++++−=     (10) 
 
 The calculation here is complicated. Hence we do the calculation using the assumption 
that 121 == ubb . Though it eases the calculations a lot, we also need to remember that this 
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assumption does not automatically satisfy all the conditions stated in equations (1) to (4). 
Therefore we must assume that there exists 1a , 2ua , iL  and uL  such that with 121 == ubb , they 
satisfy the conditions as stated in equations (1) to (4). 
 The calculations are given in Appendix 3. According to the simplification mentioned 
previously we obtain 
 
Diui wLT 50.050.0 +=         (11) 
and,  
Djuj w.L.T 500500 +=        (12) 
 
where Diw and Djw are as defined before. We are now in a position to see which country bears 
higher per capita tax burden and sends more worker. This is given in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 6: The foreign tax rate and labour migration is higher for the country with a higher 
labour endowment compared to the country with a lower labour endowment. 
 
Proof: 
 In order to find which country receives higher tax burden, subtract equation (12) from 
(11): 
 
( ) ( )jiDjDiji LL.ww.TT −=−=− 500500  
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 Therefore the foreign tax rate and labour migration are higher if labour endowment is 
higher. Further the calculations in Appendix 4 show that 22 ji LL >  if ji LL > .□ 
 
 
 The wage rate of the country with a higher labour endowment is low. Hence the 
difference between the foreign wage and the domestic wage is large. The receiving country can 
exploit this gap by imposing a higher per capita tax rate on the highly labour endowed country. 
The result is to some extent similar to that of Gatsios (1990) and Hwang and Mai (1991). In 
general it has been found that if the importing country practises a discriminatory tariff policy, the 
tariff rate is higher for the most cost-efficient exporter. In our case, the country with a higher 
labour endowment has a lower opportunity cost of migration, and that country faces higher tax 
burden.  It is also interesting to note that (shown in Appendix 4) we obtain ji DD >  if ji LL > . 
Hence the sending country should also impose a higher tax rate if endowed with a large pool of 
willing migrants. 
 Proposition (6) is another important result of the paper. It shows that how the importing 
country may resort to discrimination. If a country is more endowed with labour, that is, where 
workers are relatively poor, that country receives a higher per capita tax burden. One may ask 
about the empirical validity of this finding. As already discussed, migrants do pay taxes in many 
forms, but such taxes shall be the same for all type of migrants. To find out discriminatory tax 
rates one needs to look at monetary and non monetary conditions attached to entry and residence. 
(Winters 2005) mentioned that the developed countries are currently entering into bilateral 
agreement with different countries to target specific skills from specific countries. How foreign 
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workers face facing discrimination in wage and non-wage terms remains as an interesting 
empirical issue to analyse further. 
 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
 In this paper we worked with a model to analyse the tax/subsidy policies of two labour 
sending countries and one labour receiving country following the integration of labour markets. 
We assumed that migration was initiated by the wage differentials that existed between the 
sending and the receiving countries. Labour migration reached equilibrium when the net income 
from migration was equal to home wage rate. As migration could not be directly prohibited, the 
labour sending countries used taxes to control migration. The analysis showed that to maximise 
national income, sending countries should use a positive emigration tax. The result was contrary 
to the fact that many countries are now actually subsidising/encouraging migration. The result to 
some extent was in line with the idea of the ‘Bhagwati Tax’ (Bhagwati and Dellalfar 1973) 
though, in this paper, tax was favoured not because of the externalities that arose from migration. 
Without tax too many people migrated, which made wage earned abroad low. An emigration tax 
restricted migration and wages earned by the migrants rose.  
In analysing how a receiving country imposes a tax we have found that to maximise the 
income of permanent residents, the country might impose a positive or negative (subsidy) 
immigration tax. However, when the objective of the country was to maximise the income of 
permanent workers then it resorted to a positive tax. We have found that it imposed different tax 
rates for different countries and the country with higher labour endowment had higher tax capita 
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tax burden.  As the wage rate in the country with more labour endowment was low, the earnings 
they received from migration were initially relatively high. The receiving country exploited this 
gap by imposing a higher tax rate.  
 What lessons can we learn from the analysis? The global labour market is moving toward 
integration because of the internet despite the barriers used by many countries. Mostly, skilled 
workers migrate in this way but sooner or later migration of unskilled workers will follow this 
path. The paper is suggesting that subsidising migration for remittances is not a correct policy 
when labour markets are integrated.  
 The policy recommendation for the developed countries is that they should pursue a 
discriminatory tax policy. To what extent it is happening is an empirical question but we need to 
note that tax rate in the paper acted as a proxy of monetary barriers of entry and residence. 
Migrants from developing countries are in reality facing relatively higher barriers but as the 
income gap is very high, the barriers are not overpowering the willingness of people to emigrate. 
The barriers can come in the form of visa processing time, high application cost, mandatory 
medical check-ups or language proficiency requirement. In addition, the immigrants remain 
ineligible to receive social benefits for a substantial period of time (e.g. 5 years), though they 
may remain liable to pay all types of taxes for the whole period of time. Because of a high 
income gap, these barriers have little effect on emigration. 
 In summary, this paper is suggesting that the developing and transitional countries should 
not take the benefits of migration for granted. Policies need to be devised to control migration 
and secure the benefits. If the outflow of people is not beneficial then the country should increase 
exit barriers. In this regard the governments can consider taxing the organisations providing 
emigration services. This will be an immense task given the social-political influence of the 
 28 
groups to be effected by such policy changes. Another solution is to ensure the benefit of all 
parties by mutually beneficial negotiation such that the whole world acts cooperatively on 
migration matters. Given the segmentations of the world, such negotiation is unlikely to take 
place in the near future.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29 
Acknowledgements: 
 
The paper is a revised version of a chapter of the PhD thesis of the author completed at the 
School of Economics, University of Nottingham. The author is very much grateful to Indraneel 
Dasgupta and Arijit Mukherjee for their valuable guidance and supervision. The author would 
also like to express gratitude to Dijkastra Bouwe, Bibhas Saha, Jonathan Temple and Anna Rita 
Bennato and Sue Barnes for their valuable comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are 
the author’s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 30 
References 
 
Bhagwati J,  Dellalfar W (1973) The brain drain and income taxation. World Dev 1:  94-101.   
Brander J, Spencer B (1985) Export subsidies and international market share rivalry.  J Int Econ 
17: 83-100. 
Braun S (2008) Economic integration, process and product innovation and relative skill demand. 
Rev Int Econ 16: 864–873. 
Bretschger L (2001) Labor supply, migration and long-term development. Open Econ Rev 12: 5-
27. 
Chen M (2009) Regional economic integration and geographic concentration of multinational 
firms, Eur Econ Rev 53: 355-375. 
Clemens M (2011) Economics and emigration: trillion-dollar bills on the sidewalk?. J Econ 
Perspect 25: 83-106 
Docquier F, Rapoport H (2012) Globalization, brain drain and development. J Econ Lit 50: 681-
730. 
Gatsios K (1990) Preferential tariff and the ‘Most Favoured Nation’ principle: a note. J Int Econ 
28: 365-33.    
Haaland J, Kind H (2008) R&D policies, trade and process innovation. J Int Econ 74: 170-187. 
Haaland J, Norman V (1995) Regional Effects of European Integration. In: Baldwin R, 
Haaparanta P, Kiander J (eds) Expanding Membership of the European Union. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. Pages 193-206. 
Haufler A, Wooton I (2010) Competition for firms in an oligopolistic industry: the impact of 
economic integration. J Int Econ 80: 239-248. 
 31 
Hwang H, Mai C (1991) Optimum discriminatory tariffs under oligopolistic competition. Can J 
Econ 24: 693-02. 
International Organization for Migration (2003) Labour migration in Asia: trends, challenges and 
policy responses in countries of origin. International Organization for Migration, Geneva.  
Iranzo S, Peri G (2009) Migration and trade: theory with an application to the Eastern-Western 
European integration. J Int Econ 79: 1-19. 
Lavenex S, Uçarer E (2003) Migration and externalities of European integration. Lexington 
Books. Lanham, Maryland. 
Lundborg P, Segerstrom P (2002) The growth and welfare effects of international mass 
migration, J Int Econ 56: 177-204. 
Morita T (2012) Cost-reducing R&D investment, labor market and trade. Rev Int Econ 20: 821–
827. 
Winters A (2005) Developing country proposals for the liberalization of movements of natural 
service suppliers. Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty, 
Working Paper, T8, University of Sussex, UK  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 32 
Appendix 
 
1.  Calculation of domestic tax 
 
 The national income equation of country C  is given as 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 22222222121 2 CCCICuuuCCCCC LTLLLLbaLL
bLLaY −++−+




 −−−=  
 
 Differentiating with respect to CD  and setting the derivative zero we obtain, 
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 Using migration equilibrium condition of equation (1): 
 
02222222 =∂
∂
−
∂
∂
−
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
C
I
Cu
C
C
Cu
C
C
C
C
C
D
LLb
D
LLb
D
LD
D
Y
 
 
 Now using the equation for equilibrium labour migration of (3) and (4) and as 
( ) ( )uuuiDi LbaLbaw 2211 −+−−=  we obtain by further calculation the reaction function of country 
C : 
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( )( ) ( )( ) ( )IDIuuCDCuuuuIuuC TwbbTwbbbbbDbbbbD −+−+−=+++− 22212222121 3  
 
 Similarly the reaction function of country I  is obtained as 
 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )CDCuuIDIuuuuIuuC TwbbTwbbbbbbbDbbD −+−+−=++− 22212212122 3  
 
 
 The second derivatives have signs as required for stability as:  
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 From the two equations the following two solutions for the domestic tax rates are 
obtained: 
 
( ) ( )( )BTwATwHD IDICDCC −−−= −1       
( ) ( )( )BTwATwHD CDCIDII −−−= −1       
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where, 
( ) ( ) ( ) 08242283 4232122212314142221221 >++++=−++= uuuuuuu bbbbbbbbbbbbbH  
( )( )( )( ) 02753 423212221231322121212 >+++=−+++= uuuuuuuuu bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbA  
( )( ) 0232 423212221212122 >++=++= uuuuuu bbbbbbbbbbB  
 
 
2. Calculation of proposition 1 assuming migrates do not remit all the income to home 
 
The national income equation of country C  is given as 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 22222222121 2 CCCCCICuuuCCCCC LDLTDLLLbaLL
bLLaY +−−++−+




 −−−= δ  
 
 Where 10 ≤≤ δ . If 1=δ , migrants send all the income back home. Differentiating with 
respect to CD  we obtain, 
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Using the labour market equilibrium condition of (1), 
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 Assuming 0>CD we obtain that 0>∂
∂
C
C
D
Y . It implies that when tax rate is zero imposition 
of a positive tax increases the income. The result is hence at par with proposition 1. However 
note that we cannot get an unambiguous result using first order condition that is assuming, 
0=
∂
∂
C
C
D
Y . 
 
3. Proposition 4 
 
 
 By differentiating equation (3) and using solutions from equation (7), (8) and Proposition 
(3)  we obtain, 
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 Similarly from equation (4) we obtain, 
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We obtain, 
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 In addition, 
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 Therefore  
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4. 
 
 The income of permanent workers is given as 
 
( )( ) 222222 jjiiujiuuuLU LTLTLLLLbaY ++++−=  
 
 By differentiating 
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 When tax rates are initially zero, the value of the derivatives are positive as  
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 From Proposition (4) we have 022 <


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L . Therefore, the country uses positive 
foreign tax on the migrants. By differentiating again with respect to iT  and jT  we see that the 
second derivatives have desired signs as required for stability: 
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 In order to obtain the solutions of tax rates we set the derivatives equal to zero. We 
substitute 2iL and 2jL  from (3) and (4) and then substitute iD  and jD  from (7) and (8).  Only 
carrying the calculation for tax rate for country C  we get 
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where Diw , H , A  and B are as defined before. We also need to carry out the calculations for 
country I  too and then can find the solutions using Cramer’s rule. Assuming 121 == ubb  we 
obtain following solutions, 
 
Diui w.L.T 500500 +=        (11) 
and,  
Djuj w.L.T 500500 +=       (12) 
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 Note that we have also utilised the fact that the solution of domestic tax rates in equations 
(7) and (8) are given now as ( ) ( )( )jDjiDii TwTwD −−−= 2521
1 . 
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Fig 1. Labour Migration Equilibrium 
